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The Supreme Court of the United States has redefined the 
landscape of personal jurisdiction and venue over the past several 
years to limit where civil litigation can be filed against businesses and 
other defendants with operations in multiple states. In a series of 
unanimous or nearly unanimous decisions,1 the Court established new 
due process standards for general personal jurisdiction, which is 
where an entity can be sued for any purpose, and specific personal 
jurisdiction, which is where an entity can be sued because of the 
jurisdiction’s affiliation with a particular claim.2 This attention to 
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 1.  See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1777 (2017); BNSF Ry. Co. v. 
Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 
1514 (2017); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 2.  See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1779–80 (“Since our seminal decision in 
International Shoe, our decisions have recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: ‘general’ 
(sometimes called ‘all-purpose’) jurisdiction and ‘specific’ (sometimes called ‘case-linked’) 
jurisdiction.”) (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
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personal jurisdiction—a subject the Court left largely unchanged for 
almost seventy years3—appears directed at curbing “forum shopping” 
or “litigation tourism,” which is the practice of filing a lawsuit in a 
location believed to provide a litigation advantage to the plaintiff 
regardless of the forum’s affiliation with the parties or claims.4 
The high court’s departure from decades-old precedent reflects 
today’s changing economic and litigation environments. The Court 
recognized that its previous, permissive approach to personal 
jurisdiction, namely that a business could be sued wherever it had 
“minimum contacts” with a forum, had become anachronistic and 
inconsistent with due process now that even small businesses can have 
operations and sales in a multitude of states.5 The Court also revisited 
personal jurisdiction boundaries to address modern litigation 
gamesmanship, where lawyers take advantage of some states’ loose 
procedural rules, such as joinder and venue, to stockpile claims from 
around the country into their hand-picked jurisdictions.6 Lawyers 
have sought to leverage the dynamics of filing a large number of 
claims into a handful of jurisdictions to drive higher awards and 
settlements than if the claims were filed separately elsewhere.7 The 
theme the Court conveyed across these rulings is that location 
matters. Under the U.S. Constitution, a lawsuit can be heard only in 
the states and venues with a legal interest in that dispute. The Court 
reformulated the due process tests for establishing jurisdiction in 
order to protect these constitutional limits and rights. 
Part I of this article examines the series of personal jurisdiction 
and venue cases the Court has decided since 2011 and explains their 
impact on today’s litigation. Part II focuses on key issues regarding 
the scope and application of the Court’s new standards, as parties 
wrangle over the impact of the Court’s constitutional directives. Part 
III discusses the public policy benefits of these cases, including the 
 
 3.  See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924–26. 
 4.  See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens & Christopher Appel, The New Gold Rush: Study Reveals 
Pharmaceutical Plaintiffs Flocking to California, 24 No. 10 WESTLAW J. HEALTH L. 2, 2017 WL 
471284 (Feb. 7, 2017) (discussing forum shopping in California); Mark A. Behrens & Cary 
Silverman, Litigation Tourism In Pennsylvania: Is Venue Reform Needed?, 22 WIDENER L.J. 29, 
36–42 (2012) (discussing forum shopping in Pennsylvania); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Taking A 
Stand Against Lawlessness in American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices 
Can Protect Their Courts From Becoming Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 218 
19 (2003) (discussing forum shopping in Mississippi).  
 5.  See infra Part I.  
 6.  See infra notes 186 through 191 and accompanying text; Part III.  
 7.  See id.   
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enhanced ability for courts to decide claims on their merits. The 
article concludes that the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction rulings 
should usher in major changes that foreclose many avenues of 
traditional forum shopping and improve fairness in civil litigation. 
Whether the Court’s rulings will have this intended impact, though, 
will depend on how lower courts apply the rulings and decide the 
doctrinal issues this article examines. 
I. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S PARADIGM SHIFT IN PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE 
The starting point for the Supreme Court’s latest set of personal 
jurisdiction rulings was reexamining its “pathmarking”8 1945 decision 
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington9 and assessing how it applied 
to modern times. In International Shoe, the Court held that a state 
court had no legal authority to administer a lawsuit against an out-of-
state defendant unless the defendant had sufficient “minimum 
contacts” within that state and hearing the lawsuit there did not 
“offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”10 This 
decision was grounded in the defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right to due process; only under these circumstances would an out-of-
state defendant have notice that it could be subject to liability in that 
state. Applying this standard, the Court determined that the State of 
Washington had jurisdiction over the Missouri shoe company because 
the company employed a dozen or so salespeople in Washington. 
Those contacts, the Court held, were sufficiently “systematic and 
continuous” that to be sued in Washington did not impose an 
“unreasonable” burden on the shoe company.11 
At the time, businesses, such as International Shoe, had operations 
in only a few states.12 The Court’s “minimum contacts” standard was 
intended to loosen the reins and allow lawsuits to be brought in more 
places than just where the defendant was physically present, which 
had been the previous standard.13 Subsequent decisions applying 
International Shoe differentiated between general personal 
 
 8.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
 9.  326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 10.  Id. at 316 (internal citation omitted). 
 11.  Id. at 320. 
 12.  See id. at 313 (stating the shoe company “maintains places of business in several states, 
other than Washington”). 
 13.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
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jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction.14 General personal 
jurisdiction refers to the state or states where a company has a 
sufficient amount of contacts that it could be sued there for any 
reason and by any party. This is referred to as “all purpose” 
jurisdiction. Specific personal jurisdiction includes the additional 
states where a company could be sued because its contacts in that 
state are sufficiently linked to the specific lawsuit. The Supreme Court 
addressed the constitutional standard for a state to exercise general or 
specific personal jurisdiction in only a handful of cases in the ensuing 
decades,15 maintaining the minimum contacts rubric.16 
As the world grew more interconnected during the latter half of 
the twentieth century, particularly with the advent of the Internet, the 
due process rationale for the minimum contacts standard started to 
lose its constitutional grounding. This rationale was no longer 
sufficiently limiting, as companies were subject to litigation in a 
multitude of states. In 2011, the Court decided the first of a trilogy of 
cases setting forth new due process limits on general jurisdiction in 
the modern economy.17 In 2017, the Court revisited the confines of 
specific jurisdiction18 and issued an opinion interpreting the venue 
statute governing patent cases.19 All of these cases significantly 
restricted the places where litigation could be filed based on the 
parties and claims in the case. 
A. General Jurisdiction: Refocusing on Where a Corporation Is “At 
Home” 
The Court’s reconsideration of general personal jurisdiction began 
in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown.20 In Goodyear, 
 
 14.  See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, SA v. 
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) as an example of a case recognizing the distinction between general 
and specific personal jurisdiction). 
 15.  See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp. 
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Hall, 466 U.S. at 408; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 
U.S. 186 (1977). 
 16.  See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 108–09 (“‘[T]he constitutional touchstone’ of 
the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process 
‘remains whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum 
State.’”) (quoting Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474; Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316). 
 17.  See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 915; Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 117; BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. 
at 1549. 
 18.  See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1777. 
 19.  See TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. at 1514. 
 20.  564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
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the parents of two North Carolina teenagers killed in a bus accident 
in France sought to bring wrongful death claims in North Carolina 
against the companies that manufactured and sold the tire they 
alleged caused the accident.21 The tire was manufactured in Turkey at 
a plant of a foreign subsidiary of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company (Goodyear USA), an Ohio corporation.22 The parents 
asserted that because Goodyear USA had plants in North Carolina 
and regularly engaged in commercial activity in the state, general 
jurisdiction was properly applied to Goodyear USA as well as three 
of its foreign subsidiaries incorporated separately in France, Turkey, 
and Luxembourg.23 
The foreign subsidiaries asserted that they were not subject to suit 
in North Carolina because they had no connection to the forum other 
than that of their parent company. They had no place of business, 
employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina, were not registered to 
do business in the state, and did not design, manufacture, or advertise 
any products or solicit business in the state.24 They also did not 
directly sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers, and only a very 
small percentage of their tires were distributed in the state by other 
Goodyear USA affiliates.25 Further, the tire involved in the bus 
accident was not distributed in North Carolina.26 Nevertheless, a 
North Carolina appellate court determined that the state could 
exercise general personal jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries 
because some of the tires made abroad had reached North Carolina 
through the “stream of commerce,” a “frequently” invoked 
component of personal jurisdiction derived from International Shoe.27 
The Supreme Court rejected this “sprawling view of general 
jurisdiction,” finding that a “connection so limited between the forum 
and the foreign corporation . . . is an inadequate basis for the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction.”28 Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous 
Court, stated that “a court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign 
(sister-state or foreign-country) corporations” only “when their 
affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to 
 
 21.  See id. at 918. 
 22.  See id.  
 23.  See id. at 920. 
 24.  See id. at 921. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See id.  
 27.  Id. at 920, 926 (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009)). 
 28.  Id. at 919, 927. 
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render them essentially at home in the forum State.”29 The Court 
explained that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum is the 
individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one 
in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”30 The Court 
held that Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries were “in no sense at home 
in North Carolina” and that it would offend due process to allow the 
claimants to bring them into a North Carolina courtroom to resolve a 
dispute that occurred outside of North Carolina and had no 
connection to the state.31 Thus, the Court denounced sweeping 
theories of general personal jurisdiction based on “stream of 
commerce” or similar doctrines and established an “at home” 
jurisdictional limitation. 
In 2014, the Court returned to the topic of general personal 
jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman,32 where twenty-two 
Argentinian residents filed suit in federal district court in California 
against a German automobile manufacturer (Daimler) “based on 
events occurring entirely outside the United States.”33 The claimants 
sought to hold Daimler vicariously liable for the alleged collaboration 
of its Argentinian subsidiary with state security forces to kidnap, 
detain, torture, and kill the plaintiffs or their close relatives.34 The 
foreign plaintiffs asserted that general personal jurisdiction existed in 
California based on the extensive contacts of a U.S.-based Daimler 
subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA). MBUSA 
distributed Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independent 
dealerships throughout the United States.35 Therefore, whereas 
Goodyear dealt with whether a foreign subsidiary could be subject to 
general personal jurisdiction based on the domestic parent company’s 
contacts with a forum, Daimler considered the inverse scenario of 
whether a foreign parent company could be subject to general 
personal jurisdiction based on a domestic subsidiary’s contacts with a 
forum. The Court reinforced its new jurisprudence, stating that as 
 
 29.  Id. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (emphasis 
added). 
 30.  Id. at 924.  
 31.  Id. at 929.  
 32.  571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 33.  Id. at 120. 
 34.  See id. at 121. 
 35.  See id.  
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“[i]nstructed by Goodyear . . . Daimler is not ‘at home’ in 
California.”36 
Justice Ginsburg also authored this opinion. The Court explained 
that the connection of a foreign company’s subsidiary to California is 
irrelevant for a general jurisdiction analysis under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. “[A] tribunal’s jurisdiction over persons reaches no 
farther than the geographic bounds of [a] forum.”37 “Goodyear made 
clear that only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a 
defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there,” and that with 
respect to the parent company Daimler, “the place of incorporation 
and principal place of business are ‘paradig[m] . . . bases for general 
jurisdiction.’”38 The Court added that these “affiliations have the 
virtue of being unique—that is, each ordinarily indicates only one 
place—as well as easily ascertainable.”39 Accordingly, these affiliations 
“afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in 
which a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims.”40 
For Daimler, a company headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and 
operating principally in Germany, California was not such a forum.41 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court addressed the key public 
policy considerations favoring this modern, limited approach to 
general personal jurisdiction. What started as a strict territorial 
approach had, under International Shoe, “yielded to a less rigid 
understanding, spurred by ‘changes in the technology of 
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of 
interstate business activity.’”42 Justice Sotomayor, who concurred in 
judgment only, agreed with this premise. She stated that in “the era of 
International Shoe, it was rare for a corporation to have such 
substantial nationwide contacts that it would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in a large number of States. . . . Today, that circumstance is 
less rare.”43 Consequently, the majority held that if Daimler’s business 
in California “sufficed to allow adjudication” in the state, “the same 
global reach would presumably be available” in every other state in 
 
 36.  Id. at 122.  
 37.  Id. at 125 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)). 
 38.  Id. at 137 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924). 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  See id. at 121, 137–39.  
 42.  Id. at 126 (quoting Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 617 
(1990)). 
 43.  Id. at 156–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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which its subsidiary’s sales were “sizable.”44 The Court cautioned that 
such “exorbitant exercises” of all-purpose jurisdiction would make it 
nearly impossible for foreign defendants “to structure their primary 
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will 
and will not render them liable to suit.”45 
Three years later, the Court decided BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 
the final case in its recent trilogy of general personal jurisdiction 
rulings.46 This case involved two consolidated personal injury actions 
under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) that were filed in 
Montana state court against an American railroad company, BNSF. In 
one of the actions, a North Dakota railroad worker sought to recover 
damages for knee injuries allegedly sustained while working as a 
BNSF fuel-truck driver.47 In the other, a South Dakota widow of a 
BNSF employee sought to recover damages related to her husband’s 
alleged workplace exposure to toxic chemicals.48 Neither plaintiff 
alleged injuries arose from, or related to, work in Montana. Rather, 
both asserted that Montana could exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over BNSF based on the company’s business activities in 
the state.49 Montana had developed a reputation for being a plaintiff-
friendly state for FELA actions and the plaintiffs believed they could 
obtain better results there than in other jurisdictions.50 
Although BNSF is a Delaware corporation with its principal place 
of business in Texas,51 there is no doubt regarding its regular 
operations in Montana. In Montana, BNSF had more than 2,000 miles 
of railroad track (about 6% of the company’s total track mileage), 
around 2,100 workers (less than 5% of the company’s total 
workforce), and an automotive facility (one of the company’s twenty-
four total automotive facilities).52 The company also generated almost 
10% of its total revenue in the state.53 The plaintiffs argued that these 
contacts were sufficiently “continuous and systematic” to warrant the 
exercise of general personal jurisdiction in Montana. They also 
claimed that a Montana statute authorized state courts to exercise 
 
 44.  Id. at 139.  
 45.  Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 
 46.  137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
 47.  See id. at 1554. 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See id. 
 50.  See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 51.  See BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1554. 
 52.  See id. 
 53.  See id. 
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personal jurisdiction over railroads “doing business” in the state, and 
that state rules of civil procedure permitted state courts to assert 
jurisdiction over “[a]ll persons found within . . . Montana.”54 The 
Montana Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that 
general jurisdiction was proper under both Montana law and the 
FELA statute based on BNSF’s “substantial, continuous, and 
systematic contacts with Montana.”55 
Justice Ginsburg, once again writing for the Court, reversed the 
Montana Supreme Court’s ruling, stating “the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not permit a State to hale an 
out-of-state corporation before its courts when the corporation is not 
‘at home’ in the State and the episode-in-suit occurred elsewhere.”56 
The Court reiterated that the “‘paradigm’ forums in which a 
corporate defendant is ‘at home’ . . . are the corporation’s place of 
incorporation and its principal place of business.”57 It also made clear 
that Daimler’s “constraint” on due process “applies to all state-court 
assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants” and 
“does not vary with the type of claim asserted or business enterprise 
sued.”58 
The Court, elaborating on a footnote from Daimler, additionally 
stated that although the exercise of general jurisdiction is not 
necessarily limited to a business’s place of incorporation and principal 
place of business, it would have to be an “exceptional case” for 
operations in another state to be “so substantial and of such a nature 
as to render the corporation at home in that State” as well.59 The 
Court’s example of such an “exceptional case” was Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co., in which World War II had “forced” the 
defendant to relocate temporarily from the Philippines to Ohio, 
making Ohio “the center of the corporation’s wartime activities.”60 
Collectively, the Goodyear, Daimler, and BNSF decisions 
represent a major shift in the Court’s due process approach to general 
personal jurisdiction. The previous method of subjecting a business to 
jurisdiction in all states where it has “minimum contacts” has given 
 
 54.  See id. 
 55.  See Tyrrell v. BNSF Railway Co., 373 P. 3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2016). 
 56.  BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1554. 
 57.  Id. at 1558. 
 58.  Id. at 1558–59.  
 59.  Id. (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n. 19).  
 60.  Id. (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 130 n. 8). 
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way to determining the one or two states in which a company is “at 
home.”61 This change addressed the Court’s concern that the modern 
economy would facilitate “sprawling” and “exorbitant” uses of 
general jurisdiction, requiring cases to be heard in locations that do 
not have a legal interest in a matter. As a result, companies that 
operate in multiple states could “structure their primary conduct” and 
operations such that they would know where they could face all-
purpose liability.62 
B. Specific Jurisdiction: Reassessing the Scope of Contacts “Related” 
to a Legal Action 
A few weeks after BNSF in 2017, the Court decided Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb Co. (BMS) v. Superior Court, which restrained forum shopping 
based on specific or “case-linked” personal jurisdiction.63 The Court 
explained that a state that does not have general personal jurisdiction 
over a defendant can still exercise specific personal jurisdiction 
against it if the claim at issue “aris[es] out of or relat[es] to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum.”64 Such a state has a legitimate 
legal interest in the dispute because there is “an affiliation between 
the forum and the underlying controversy.”65 Specific jurisdiction, as 
the name implies, is specific to each claim. A state may have specific 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state manufacturer for claims by its citizens 
for products purchased in the state, but not for claims of other state’s 
residents—even when they are suing the same manufacturer over the 
same products. Otherwise, the Court explained, the line between 
specific and general jurisdiction would be nonexistent.66 
In BMS, the Court reviewed eight separate mass actions against 
the pharmaceutical company, Bristol Myers Squibb, in California. The 
plaintiffs in each case alleged injury from taking a BMS drug to 
prevent blood clots after a recent heart attack or stroke.67 In each 
mass action, scores of out-of-state plaintiffs joined their lawsuits to 
California-based claims in hopes of having their cases heard in 
California. Collectively, the claims included 86 California residents 
 
 61.  Goodyear, 654 U.S. at 919, 923 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 
 62.  See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 63.  137 S. Ct. 1777, 1178 (2017).  
 64.  Id. at 1780 (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 127). 
 65.  Id. (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
 66.  See id. at 1178–79 (rejecting “sliding scale” approach to specific personal jurisdiction). 
 67.  See id. at 1778. 
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and 592 residents from thirty-three other states.68 The non-California 
claimants did not allege they obtained the drug through California 
physicians or pharmacies, or that they received treatment for their 
alleged injuries in California.69 Rather, their theories for both general 
and specific jurisdiction were based solely on BMS’s operations and 
sales in California.70 
It was clear to the California appellate courts that under Daimler, 
the state did not have general jurisdiction over BMS.71 BMS is 
incorporated in Delaware, headquartered in New York, and maintains 
most of its operations in New York and New Jersey.72 BMS’s 
connections with California, however, included several research and 
laboratory facilities, employing around 250 people, for some of its 
other products in the state, as well as a small state-government 
relations office.73 BMS also generated more than $900 million in 
revenue from the sale of the drug at issue in California between 2006 
and 2012, which amounted to a little more than one percent of the 
company’s nationwide sales revenue.74 The California Supreme Court 
held that the combination of significant sales of the drug in California 
and similarities among the in- and out-of-state claimants justified 
California’s exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over all of the 
claims in the mass actions. In so doing, the California Supreme Court 
articulated a “sliding scale approach to specific jurisdiction.”75 It held 
that “the nature of the defendant’s activities in the forum and the 
relationship of the claim to those activities” is “inversely related” such 
that the “more wide ranging the defendant’s forum contacts,” the less 
direct the relationship needs to be to those contacts.76 Three justices of 
the California Supreme Court dissented, stating that this novel rule 
“weaken[ed] the [case-linked] relatedness requirement” and 
“expand[ed] specific jurisdiction to the point that, for a large category 
of defendants, it becomes indistinguishable from general 
jurisdiction.”77 
 
 68.  See id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  See id.  
 72.  See id. 
 73.  See id. 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 636, 650, 654 (Cal. 2016), 
rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
 76.  Id. (quoting Snowney v. Harrah’s Ent., Inc., 112 P.3d 28, 37 (Cal. 2005)). 
 77.  Id. at 663 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling, agreeing with the 
dissent and characterizing the sliding scale approach as “a loose and 
spurious form of general jurisdiction.”78 Indeed, Justice Ginsburg 
warned in oral argument in BMS that this case appeared to be an 
attempt by claimants “to reintroduce general jurisdiction, which was 
lost in Daimler, by the backdoor” of specific jurisdiction.79 Justice 
Alito wrote the BMS opinion for the near-unanimous Court; Justice 
Sotomayor was the only dissenter. As with general jurisdiction, the 
Court’s primary concern remained the “burden on the defendant.”80 
A defendant has a due process right not to be subject to a state’s 
judicial system for claims that have no sufficient nexus to that state.81 
In addition, the Court explained that jurisdiction invokes the 
“territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.”82 
Federalism bars one state from over-reaching and hearing claims that 
should be heard elsewhere. In this regard, defendants must be 
protected from “the coercive power of a State that may have little 
legitimate interest in the claims in question.”83 Accordingly, California 
was not permitted to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over BMS 
“without identifying any adequate link between the State and the 
nonresidents’ claims.”84 
The Court further clarified that “general connections with the 
forum are not enough.”85 Therefore, BMS’s sales in California, 
regardless of how extensive, failed to establish a connection between 
California and the nonresidents’ claims. In addition, the “mere fact 
that other plaintiffs were prescribed, obtained, and ingested [the drug] 
in California—and allegedly sustained the same injuries as did the 
nonresidents” did not give California jurisdiction over the out-of-state 
claims.86 
C. Venue: Limiting Forum Shopping in Patent Disputes 
In 2017, the Court also restricted forum shopping in a federal 
 
 78.  Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 1777, 1781 (2017). 
 79.  Oral Argument, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., No. 16-466, Apr. 25, 2017, at 
54 (statement of Justice Ginsburg). 
 80.  Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 
U.S. at 292). 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  Id. (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 1781.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
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venue case, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC.87 
Here, a business brought a patent infringement claim in federal 
district court in Delaware against a competitor in the flavored drink 
market.88 The defendant, a company incorporated and headquartered 
in Indiana, sought to transfer the suit to a federal court in Indiana on 
the basis that Delaware was not the proper venue because the 
company did not “reside” in Delaware within the meaning of the 
patent venue statute.89 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the defendant “resides” in 
Delaware under the statute because the U.S. District Court of 
Delaware could exercise personal jurisdiction over the claim.90 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed this decision. It 
determined that the patent venue statute’s definition of “resides” 
limits venue for domestic corporations “only to the State of 
incorporation.”91 As a result, a plaintiff alleging patent infringement 
can bring suit in only two places authorized by the statute: 1) the 
defendant’s state of incorporation, or 2) where the defendant 
“committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established 
place of business.”92 These venue requirements—providing a type of 
“all-purpose” and “case-linked” venue—parallel the Court’s 
constitutional limitations for general and specific personal 
jurisdiction. 
The impact of TC Heartland was felt disproportionately in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which had become a 
popular destination for patent cases—housing more than forty 
percent of all patent cases in the United States.93 The court had 
become known as the “rocket docket” for pushing patent disputes to 
trial faster than other jurisdictions.94 Because the court’s procedures 
favored quick settlements, the court became the preferred forum for 
 
 87.  137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017). 
 88.  See id. at 1517. 
 89.  See id.  
 90.  See id. at 1520. 
 91.  Id. at 1521. 
 92.  Id. at 1519 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)). 
 93.  See Lisa Shuchman, Eastern Texas Had an ‘Astounding’ Number of Patent Cases in 
2015, CORP. COUNS., Jan. 7, 2016, at https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/almID/1202746460787/ 
Eastern-Texas-Had-an-Astounding-Number-of-Patent-Cases-in-2015/ (reporting that 2,540 
patent lawsuit, or approximately 44% of U.S. patent cases, were filed in the Eastern District of 
Texas in 2015). 
 94.  See Mark Curriden, The ‘Rocket Docket’ Starts to Fizzle, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 27, 2017, 
at https://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/The-rocket-docket-starts-to-fizzle- 
10890604.php. 
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thousands of highly speculative “patent troll” cases, as well as 
traditional patent claims.95 In the wake of TC Heartland, hundreds of 
defendants in these patent cases sought to transfer their cases out of 
East Texas.96 The number of new patent filings in this court 
plummeted by more than sixty-five percent in the year following TC 
Heartland.97 
Eastern District of Texas Judge Rodney Gilstrap, who presided 
over a quarter of the nation’s patent lawsuits in 2015 and 2016,98 
issued a ruling after TC Heartland that sought to keep many of these 
cases in his courtroom.99 In this case, Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., Judge 
Gilstrap developed an expansive four-factor test for determining 
whether a company had “a regular and established place of business” 
where acts of patent infringement were committed.100 He suggested 
that a defendant’s “physical location in the district is not a 
prerequisite to proper venue”; it is only “a persuasive factor for courts 
to consider” along with the defendant’s representations, interactions 
with consumers, and benefits in the forum.101 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted 
mandamus review of the case in which Judge Gilstrap announced this 
test and struck it down.102 The Federal Circuit pointed out that 
“litigants and courts are raising with increased frequency” the issue of 
physical location in an effort to bypass the Supreme Court’s holding 
in TC Heartland.103 But the court indicated that requiring a physical, 
geographical nexus to alleged acts of patent infringement reflected 
the spirit of TC Heartland. The purpose of the Supreme Court’s ruling 
 
 95.  See id.  
 96.  See Paul M. Janicke, The Imminent Outpouring from the Eastern District of Texas, 2017 
PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 1, 9, available at https://cdn.patentlyo.com/media/2017/03/Janicke. 
2017.Venue_.pdf (estimating at least 500 cases in which venue is improper and not waived). 
 97.  See Mark Curriden, Patent Filings Plummet in East Texas, HOUS. CHRON., May 22, 
2018, at https://www.chron.com/business/article/Patent-filings-plummet-in-East-Texas 
-12932436.php. 
 98.  See John Browning, Is the Rocket Docket Crashing?, DMAGAZINE, Oct. 2017, at 
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-ceo/2017/october/eastern-district-texas-patent-
cases/; Kaleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s Patent Cases, 
VICE: MOTHERBOARD, May 5, 2016, at https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/aek3pp/the-
small-town-judge-who-sees-a-quarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases. 
 99.  See Yar Chaikovsky & Wei Wang, Gilstrap’s Venue Test: The 4 Factors And What They 
Mean, Law360, July 12, 2017, at https://www.law360.com/articles/943450/gilstrap-s-venue-test-
the-4-factors-and-what-they-mean. 
 100.  258 F. Supp. 3d 781 (E.D. Tex.), vacated, 871 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 101.  Id. at 797. 
 102.  See In re Cray Inc. 871 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 103.  Id. at 1359. 
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was to confine venue to established places of operation such as a 
business’s place of incorporation in a “new era” where “not all 
corporations operate under a brick-and-mortar model” and business 
may be conducted virtually.104 
Taken collectively, these five Supreme Court cases—Goodyear, 
Daimler, BNSF, BMS, and TC Heartland—re-focused and limited 
where civil lawsuits can and should be brought. However, as with 
Judge Gilstrap and patent venue cases, some courts and litigants 
around the country have been trying to narrow the Court’s personal 
jurisdiction rulings to maintain the status quo. 
II. DOCTRINAL ISSUES ARISING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION DECISIONS 
A number of new battlegrounds have arisen in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s new constitutional standards for personal 
jurisdiction. This section examines some of these issues, both as they 
have played out in pending litigation and as they are expected to arise 
in the near future. 
A. Waiver of Personal Jurisdiction Challenges in Pending Litigation 
The first jurisdictional issue to arise involves the application of the 
Court’s new standards to pending cases: can defendants successfully 
move to have their claims dismissed or transferred to appropriate 
jurisdictions? In some states, there are hundreds or even thousands of 
such pending cases. Often, the defendant did not challenge personal 
jurisdiction when the case was filed because the application of 
precedents derived from International Shoe would likely have allowed 
the claims to be filed in those states. Plaintiffs have argued that the 
failure to object to personal jurisdiction then resulted in the waiver of 
any right to make such objections for the remainder of the litigation. 
Courts addressing this waiver issue have reached different 
conclusions.105 
In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Gucci 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See BMS Battlegrounds: Practical Advice for Litigating Personal Jurisdiction After 
Bristol-Myers, U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform (June 2018), at 22, available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/research/bms-battlegrounds-research [hereafter BMS 
Battlegrounds] (discussing waiver issue); At Least Listen to Us Now – Waiver & Personal 
Jurisdiction, Drug & Device Law, Apr. 23, 2018, at https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/ 
2018/04/at-least-listen-to-us-now-waiver-personal-jurisdiction.html (same). 
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America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, held that “a defendant does not waive a 
personal jurisdiction argument—even if he does not make it in the 
district court—if the ‘argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over 
[the] defendant would have been directly contrary to controlling 
precedent’” at the time.106 This case involved claims of counterfeiting 
against a foreign company and efforts to freeze its accounts in the 
Bank of China, which had a branch in New York. “Prior to Daimler,” 
the court explained, “controlling precedent in this Circuit made it 
clear that a foreign bank with a branch in New York was properly 
subject to general personal jurisdiction here.”107 Because Daimler 
reversed this outcome, the court rejected the plaintiff’s waiver 
argument. 
As a federal district court explained in another case, “[i]t was only 
after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Daimler that the scope 
of Goodyear’s ‘at home’ test was appreciated.”108 Here, the court 
found that plaintiffs would not suffer any prejudice by allowing a 
defendant to assert a general personal jurisdiction challenge.109 Other 
courts have reached the same result.110 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached the 
opposite conclusion in American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of 
New York Mellon.111 The court rejected the New York bank’s assertion 
that it did not waive its challenge to general personal jurisdiction in 
Oklahoma. To support this ruling, the court suggested that the 
“Goodyear standard was not new; it summarized a longstanding 
jurisdictional rule.”112 As a result, it held that the bank waived its right 
to object to jurisdiction even under the recently articulated standards. 
The notion that the general jurisdiction rules under Goodyear and 
Daimler are “not new” is at odds with the Justices’ view of the cases. 
For example, Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion in Daimler, 
 
 106.  768 F.3d 122, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 107.  Id. at 136 (emphasis in original). 
 108.  Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 3, 14–15 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); In 
re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 4634541, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 
2015); 7 West 57th St. Realty Co., LLC v. Citigroup, Inc., 2015 WL 1514539, at *5–7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 31, 2015) (“Gucci America unequivocally holds . . . . that Daimler effected a change in the 
law, providing defendants . . . with a personal jurisdiction defense that was previously 
unavailable to them.”). 
 111.  810 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 112.  Id. at 1238; see also Sloan v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 856 (N.D. Cal. 
2018) (finding personal jurisdiction challenge waived). 
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expressed her opposition to the majority’s general personal 
jurisdiction analysis, but still recognized the Court’s shift from 
minimum contacts to the at home test represented a “new rule of 
constitutional law.”113 
A similar split has arisen in cases involving waiver of specific 
personal jurisdiction. For instance, a federal district court in California 
determined that although BMS “was not announcing a new rule in 
regards to the principles of specific jurisdiction . . . it is not clear that 
[the defendant] would have had a viable basis for challenging 
personal jurisdiction” with respect to certain plaintiffs under the then-
existing law.114 A federal district court in Illinois similarly found that a 
specific personal jurisdiction challenge “was not ‘then available’ to 
defendants” prior to BMS, and that “even if defendants had waived 
this defense, the Court finds that it would be appropriate to excuse 
the forfeiture.”115 Other courts, however, have agreed with plaintiffs’ 
waiver arguments that BMS “involves only the ‘straightforward 
application’ of ‘settled principles’” of jurisdiction doctrine and was 
not a “game changing” or “transformative” decision.116 
The waiver issue affects only cases filed before the Supreme 
Court’s rulings, but the briefings and rulings provide the first window 
into the views of litigants and courts about their impact on state 
claims and can influence other outstanding issues that are certain to 
arise. 
B. Jurisdiction by Consent Based on Compliance with State Business 
Registration Laws 
One of the first theories for reducing or negating the impact of the 
Supreme Court’s general personal jurisdiction rulings is based on 
consent. The argument is that when a company registers to do 
 
 113.  571 U.S. at 160 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 114.  Feller v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 6453262, at * 4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 
2017).   
 115.  Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque de Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 863 
(N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 116.  Thomas v. Kellogg Co., 2017 WL 5256634, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2017). Still other 
courts have determined that, irrespective of the import of BMS, defendants waived their 
jurisdictional challenges because they simply failed to make them in a timely manner. See 
Alvarez v. NBTY, Inc., 2017 WL 6059159, *4–7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017) (“With or without 
Bristol-Myers, Defendants could have argued that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident Defendants . . . . Because of their failure to do so, Defendants waived this 
argument.”); PS Kids LLC v. Paymaster Bus. Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 999973, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 
21, 2018) (finding personal jurisdiction arguments waived). 
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business in a state it consents to be subject to that state’s laws, 
including the state’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction.117 
Commercial entities must generally register to conduct any business 
in a state. Consequently, if registration were interpreted as consent, a 
company would be subject to all-purpose jurisdiction in a number of 
states, not solely where they are “at home.” 
Most courts have rejected the notion of “jurisdiction by consent” 
for mere compliance with a business registration law.118 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Brown v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., explained that if “mere” registration and appointment of an 
agent in a state were enough to grant general jurisdiction, “every 
corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction in every state in 
which it registered, and Daimler’s ruling would be robbed of meaning 
by a back-door thief.”119 The court stated that in Daimler, the 
Supreme Court “rejected the idea that a corporation was subject to 
general jurisdiction in every state in which it conducted substantial 
business.”120 The court also pointed out that this “expansive” view of 
registration statutes “could justify the exercise of general jurisdiction 
over a corporation in a state in which the corporation had done no 
business at all, so long as it had registered.”121 
The Delaware Supreme Court similarly rejected a jurisdiction-by-
consent argument under the state’s registration statutes. The court 
concluded that “after Daimler, it is not tenable to read Delaware’s 
registration statutes” the same way as the court did under its prior 
rulings.122 “Daimler makes plain that it is inconsistent with principles 
of due process to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation that is not ‘essentially at home’ in a state for claims 
 
 117.  See BMS Battlegrounds, supra note 105, at 21. 
 118.  See 50 State Survey On General Jurisdiction Through Consent By Registration To Do 
Business: Putting Bauman and Baseball Back Together, Drug & Device Law, Dec. 18, 2017, at 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/12/quasi-guest-post-50-state-survey-on-general-
jurisdiction-through-consent-by-registration-to-do-business-putting-bauman-and-baseball-back-
together.html (reporting that courts in around 40 jurisdictions have rejected personal 
jurisdiction based on compliance with business registration laws).   
 119.  814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 120.  Id.   
 121.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 122.  Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 126 (Del. 2016); see also Humphries v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1510441, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2018) (“A categorical assertion of 
general jurisdiction where the corporation complies with a state’s registration and appointment 
laws would essentially contradict Daimler and BNSF’s limitation of general jurisdiction to a 
corporation’s place of incorporation, principal place of business, and exceptional cases where 
contacts with the forum state are substantial and of such nature to render it at home.”). 
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having no rational connection to the state.”123 According to the court, 
Delaware’s registration statute does not grant general jurisdiction; it 
solely “provid[es] a means for service of process.”124 The state high 
court additionally reasoned that “it is critical to the efficient conduct 
of business, and therefore to job- and wealth-creation, that individual 
states not exact unreasonable tolls simply for the right to do 
business.”125 “If all of our sister states were to exercise general 
jurisdiction over our many corporate citizens, who often as a practical 
matter must operate in all fifty states and worldwide to compete, that 
would be inefficient and reduce legal certainty.”126 The result would be 
a “collective detriment of the common good.”127 
Courts in four states—Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska and 
Pennsylvania—have reached the opposite conclusion. They 
determined that a corporate defendant’s registration to do business in 
the state, and designation of an agent upon whom process may be 
served, is sufficient to subject that defendant to general personal 
jurisdiction.128 The courts generally relied on precedents predating the 
recent line of general personal jurisdiction decisions and marginalized 
Daimler.129 For example, a Nebraska court suggested that Daimler 
“circumscribes the extent to which a defendant can be compelled to 
submit to general jurisdiction, but it does nothing to limit the 
defendant’s capacity to consent to jurisdiction—and therefore, it does 
nothing to upset well-settled law regarding what acts may operate to 
imply consent.”130 In Pennsylvania, jurisdiction by consent is based on 
 
 123.  Id. at 128. 
 124.  Id. 148. 
 125.  Id. at 127.  
 126.  Id. at 142–43.  
 127.  Id. at 143.  
 128.  See supra note 118.   
 129.  In this regard, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Knowlton 
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990), has proven particularly influential. 
There, the court, applying Minnesota law, held that the “appointment of an agent for service of 
process . . . gives consent to the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action, whether 
or not arising out of activities within the state.” Id. at 1200. See, e.g., Spanier v. Am. Pop Corn 
Co., 2016 WL 1465400, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 14, 2016) (relying on Knowlton); Ally Bank v. 
Lenox Fin. Mortg. Corp., 2017 WL 830391, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2017) (same); Consol. 
Infrastructure Grp., Inc. v. USIC, LLC, 2017 WL2222917, at *7 (D. Neb. May 18, 2017) (same); 
Perrigo Co. v. Merial Ltd., 2015 WL 1538088, at *7 (D. Neb. Apr. 7, 2015) (same). 
 130.  Perrigo, 2015 WL 1538088, at *7 (emphasis added); see also Spanier, 2016 WL 1465400, 
at *4 (stating that neither Daimler nor Goodyear “contains any meaningful discussion of 
consent to jurisdiction and neither defendant consented to suit in the forum state”); Ally Bank, 
2017 WL 830391, at *3 (“The Daimler court addressed the limits of general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation, not the limits of a defendant’s capacity to consent to personal 
jurisdiction.”). 
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a unique corporate registration statute that expressly states that the 
“carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of [a company’s] 
general business” in the Commonwealth “shall constitute a sufficient 
basis of jurisdiction.”131 Even with this particular registration statute, 
several federal district courts have suggested that in light of Daimler, 
mere compliance with the statute may no longer be sufficient to 
establish jurisdiction by consent.132 In the weeks before this article’s 
publication, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed to hear this 
issue.133 
As with the waiver issue, most courts recognize that the Supreme 
Court intended its personal jurisdiction holdings to be transformative. 
They rightfully view compliance with a registration statute as 
insufficient to consent to general jurisdiction; holding otherwise, they 
have concluded, would “distort the language and purpose” of the 
Court’s rulings.134 That most courts have rejected jurisdiction by 
consent when confronted with the issue provides strong evidence that 
the Court’s rulings are taking root. 
C. General Jurisdiction Battleground: Scope of the “Exceptional 
Cases” Exception 
As indicated, the Supreme Court’s “at home” rule for general 
personal jurisdiction provides a straightforward standard for courts to 
apply: any case may be brought in a corporate defendant’s state of 
 
 131.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301; Webb–Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 2018 
WL 3153602, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 28, 2018); see also Youse v. Johnson & Johnson, 2019 
WL 233884, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2019) (holding “registration to do business in Pennsylvania 
is sufficient to create general personal jurisdiction” in asbestos case involving exposure to talc 
products). 
 132.  See Antonini v. Ford Motor Co., 2017 WL 3633287, at *2 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2017) 
(stating that registration plus other contacts “more closely resemble those found insufficient to 
establish general jurisdiction”); McCaffrey v. Windsor at Windermere Ltd. P’ship, 2017 WL 
1862326, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2017) (recognizing registration to do business insufficient for 
general jurisdiction under Daimler). 
 133.  See Hammons v. Ethicon, Inc., Case No. 458 EAL 2018 (accepted for review Apr. 10, 
2019). 
 134.  In Re: Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 2349105, at *4 (D. Mass. 
May 4, 2016) (applying Missouri law); see also Keeley v. Pfizer Inc., 2015 WL 3999488, at *4 n.2 
(E.D. Mo. July 1, 2015) (stating consent to jurisdiction based on compliance with state 
registration statutes is “contrary to the holding in Daimler that merely doing business in a state 
is not enough to establish general jurisdiction.”); see also Beard v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 
2016 WL 1746113, at *2 (E.D. Mo. May 3, 2016) (“The Court recognizes the line of older cases 
that have found that personal jurisdiction can be based upon having a registered agent in the 
forum statue” but “agrees with more recent judicial precedent from the United States Supreme 
Court and this district that have determined that more substantial contacts are required to hale 
a litigant into the court’s forum.”). 
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incorporation or principal place of business. But the Court also 
discussed an “exceptional case” caveat where “a corporate 
defendant’s operations in another forum ‘may be so substantial and of 
such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’”135 
The Court identified only one such “exceptional case,” where war had 
“forced” a corporation to temporarily relocate from the Philippines to 
Ohio.136 In Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in BNSF concurring and 
dissenting in part, she stated that the majority’s decision “could be 
understood to limit [the exceptional case] exception to the exact 
facts” of the wartime illustration.137 Her concern that the Court’s 
interpretation was “so narrow as to read the exception out of 
existence entirely” offers some insight into how narrow the Court 
intended the exception to be.138 
Nevertheless, claimants have begun arguing that their cases fit this 
exception.139 Courts, though, have read the exception as extremely 
 
 135.  BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1558. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring and dissenting in part).  
 138.  Id.  
 139.  See, e.g., Kaz. v. Ketebaev, 2018 WL 2763308, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) (finding 
that foreign government’s federal action against alleged computer hackers from several other 
foreign countries did not constitute “exceptional case” allowing exercise of general personal 
jurisdiction in California); Perry v. JTM Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 2018 WL 1635855, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Apr. 5, 2018) (“[T]he court concludes that there is no exceptional circumstance warranting 
general jurisdiction over defendant in Illinois.”); Data Research & Handling, Inc. v. 
Vongphachanh, 310 F. Supp. 3d 956, 962 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 27, 2018) (finding national trade 
association not sufficiently “at home” in Indiana so as to subject it to personal jurisdiction and 
that action was “not . . . an exceptional case” envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court); Pinnacle 
Ins. & Fin. Servs., LLC v. Sehnoutka, 2017 WL 3193641 (M.D. Fla. July 27, 2017) (“the Court 
determines that this is not one of those ‘exceptional cases’ where Defendants’ contacts with 
Florida are so substantial as to render them effectively ‘at home’ here”); Strauss v. Crédit 
Lyonnais, S.A., 175 F. Supp. 3d 3, 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“The Court has little difficulty 
concluding that the facts here do not present an exceptional case.”); Farber v. Tennant Truck 
Lines, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 421, 433 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (stating that defendant’s payment of 
withholding and corporate taxes, among other contacts with a forum, “‘plainly do[es] not 
approach’ the threshold level of contact required by Goodyear and Daimler; this payment does 
not create the ‘exceptional case’ in which general jurisdiction in a state other than the state of 
incorporation and principal place of business would be justified”) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 
139 n.19); Ritchie Cap. Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2015 WL 13019620, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2015) (“A review of Plaintiffs’ own allegations and the documents they have 
submitted to support their arguments in favor of jurisdiction demonstrate that this case is far 
from exceptional.”); In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 4634541, at 
*21 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2015) (“We conclude without hesitation that none of [defendant’s] 
contacts with New York and Virginia comprises an ‘exceptional case where [the defendant’s] 
contacts with [those states] are so substantial as to render it ‘at home’ in that state.’”) (quoting 
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014)); Thackurdeen 
v. Duke Univ., 130 F. Supp. 3d 792, 799 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Plaintiffs have failed to explain why 
this represents an exceptional case to the general rule . . . .”). 
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narrow.140 As one federal district court concluded, “the Supreme 
Court has found only one such ‘exceptional case’ in the last 70 
years.”141 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision 
in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., provides a thoughtful discussion 
on this exception.142 Here, a deceased Air Force mechanic argued that 
Lockheed Martin’s physical presence and operations in Connecticut 
“for at least 30 years” presented such an “exceptional case.”143 The 
court explained that Daimler “considerably altered the analytic 
landscape for general jurisdiction and left little room” for arguments 
that a large corporation’s substantial operations in a particular state 
could subject it to general jurisdiction.144 “[W]hen a corporation is 
neither incorporated nor maintains its principal place of business in a 
state, mere contacts, no matter how ‘systematic and continuous,’ are 
extraordinarily unlikely to add up to an ‘exceptional case.’”145 The 
court further reasoned that because corporations frequently “have 
presences in multiple states exceeding that of [the defendant] in 
Connecticut, general jurisdiction would be quite the opposite of 
‘exceptional’ if such contacts were held sufficient to render the 
corporation ‘at home’ in the state.”146 Rather, the exception is 
reserved for the unique situation in which the proposed forum is a 
“surrogate principal place of business.”147 
A survey of cases discussing the Supreme Court’s “exceptional 
case” doctrine reveals no clear illustration of the exception other than 
the wartime example provided by the Court despite numerous cases 
in which claimants have argued exceptional circumstances based on a 
 
 140.  See, e.g., In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, New York, Inc., 745 F.3d 30, 39 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (acknowledging U.S. Supreme Court’s “exceptional case” exception to general 
jurisdiction “beyond a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business,” but 
stating “[t]his is not that case” because defendant’s “scant contacts with Vermont do not come 
close”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]his is clearly not ‘an 
exceptional case’ where the [defendant’s] contacts are ‘so continuous and systematic as to 
render [it] essentially at home in the forum.’”); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 
(9th Cir. 2014) (“This is not such an exceptional case.”); see also Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. 
Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (noting that it is “incredibly difficult to establish general 
jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business.”). 
 141.  Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2018 WL 2381888, at *4 (W.D. N.Y. May 25, 2018); see 
also Adams v. Horton, 2017 WL 2493127, at *2 (D. Vt. June 8, 2017) (noting “the Second 
Circuit has yet to find such a case”). 
 142.  814 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 143.  Id. at 628. 
 144.  Id.  
 145.  Id. at 629. 
 146.  Id. at 630. 
 147.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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corporate defendant’s relationship to a forum.148 The notion that there 
can be only one possible surrogate principal place of business appears 
most plausible given the Court’s decision to limit the exercise of 
general personal jurisdiction against corporate defendants to only two 
potential forums—the place of incorporation and the principal place 
of business—in the “ordinary,” unexceptional case. 
D. Specific Jurisdiction Battleground: Sufficient Affiliations to 
Establish Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court’s test for specific personal jurisdiction is not 
as crystal clear as the “at home” requirement for general personal 
jurisdiction. The Court in BMS held that there must be an “affiliation 
between the forum and the underlying controversy” for the court to 
exercise specific jurisdiction over the claim, but it did not explain 
what constitutes a sufficient “affiliation.”149 What the Court made 
clear is that general business activities, regardless of how extensive, 
and joinder of an unaffiliated claim with someone else’s valid claim 
do not suffice.150 The Court also rejected the BMS plaintiffs’ “last 
ditch” effort to establish specific jurisdiction in California because 
BMS used a California supply chain distributor.151 The fact that BMS 
contracted with a California distributor was “not enough to establish 
personal jurisdiction” over out-of-state claims.152 If it were, it would 
have created a major issue with respect to any business’s contracting 
with a distributor or other entities for services such as product 
advertising, consulting, tax preparation, or legal services. Instead, the 
court suggested that relationships with third parties are insufficient to 
establish specific jurisdiction over a claim. 
So, what kind of connections are necessary and how strong do 
those connections need to be in order to be considered an 
“affiliation” for specific jurisdiction purposes? Plaintiffs, not 
surprisingly, have sought to push these limits in order to maintain 
some ability to choose among a greater number of forums. For 
example, to keep out-of-state cases in St. Louis—a preferred 
destination for out-of-state claims153—plaintiffs have alleged that if a 
company’s marketing strategy for a product, its labeling and 
 
 148.  See supra notes 139 and 140. 
 149.  BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).  
 150.  See id. at 1781. 
 151.  Id. at 1783. 
 152.  See id. 
 153.  See discussion infra Section III.C. 
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regulatory approval, or early clinical trials have any connection to 
Missouri then Missouri courts can exercise specific jurisdiction over 
out-of-state claims related to those products.154 A federal district court 
in Missouri rejected such efforts, finding these connections “too 
attenuated.”155 In another case, the court explained that it is “of no 
consequence” that Missouri “happened to be” where the product was 
first marketed, particularly when out-of-state plaintiffs did not see the 
marketing.156 There simply is no specific personal jurisdiction when 
the plaintiff was not injured in the state. 
Plaintiffs’ efforts to push the limits of establishing specific 
jurisdiction also implicate how much discovery a claimant may obtain 
from a corporate defendant for the preliminary purpose of 
establishing personal jurisdiction.157 Allowing broad discovery on 
purely jurisdictional matters, before the merits of any alleged claim 
are considered, could create an undue burden on the defendant and 
lead to litigation tactics where the plaintiff’s lawyer seeks to leverage 
the imposition of significant jurisdictional discovery costs in order to 
secure a settlement.158 As courts examining this issue have 
appreciated, such “jurisdictional discovery is not available merely 
because the plaintiff requests it,” but rather is reserved for 
particularized factual disputes.159 One federal appellate court 
cautioned that “a plaintiff may not . . . undertake a fishing expedition 
based only upon bare allegations, under the guise of jurisdictional 
discovery.”160 Another federal appellate court observed the 
substantial costs that may be implicated, finding in a case that 
“[j]urisdictional discovery yielded over 5.8 million pages of 
documents, including almost a million pages of contract documents, 
 
 154.  See Hinton v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 3725776, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 27, 2018) (citing 
cases); Dyson v. Bayer Corp., 2018 WL 534375, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 24, 2018). 
 155.  Dyson, 2018 WL 534375, at *5. 
 156.  Hinton, 2018 WL 3725776, at *4. 
 157.  See BMS Battlegrounds, supra note 105, at 14–16 (discussing case examples). 
 158.  See id. at 15 (jurisdictional discovery may be “unduly burdensome and costly for 
defendants forced to litigate in a court that has no business exercising jurisdiction, even when 
jurisdictional discovery is supposedly ‘limited’”). 
 159.  Malik v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 710 Fed. Appx. 561, 565 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting 
Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 108 n.38 (3d Cir. 2015)); see also 
Aviation One of Fla., Inc. v. Airborne Ins. Consultants (PTY), Ltd, 722 Fed. Appx. 870, 878 
(11th Cir. 2018); Rippon v. Smigel, 158 A.3d 23, 32 (N.J. App. Div. 2017) (“Generally, the 
record must support the existence of disputed or conflicting facts to warrant jurisdictional 
discovery.”). 
 160.  Id. (quoting Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 
157 (3d Cir. 2010)). 
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and 34 witness depositions.”161 Such costs counter the Supreme 
Court’s “primary concern” in BMS of excessive defense burdens.162 
Consideration of, and discovery into, a corporate defendant’s 
potential affiliations with a forum that permit the exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction underscore courts’ need to evaluate specific 
jurisdiction as it applies to each claim asserted by a plaintiff.163 The 
same concern about grouping together similar claims of in- and out-
of-state plaintiffs to establish jurisdiction over all claims, which was 
expressly rejected in BMS, applies with equal force to attempts to use 
the existence of specific jurisdiction over one type of claim to exercise 
specific jurisdiction over disparate claims. A plaintiff may be able to 
establish specific jurisdiction over one claim against a defendant, such 
as deceptive advertising, but not other claims, such as product design 
liability. As a result, plaintiffs may be limited to where they can bring 
an action for all of their claims, which could significantly impact 
asbestos litigation and other mass tort litigation involving a multitude 
of claims. Courts, both before and after BMS, have recognized that 
“[p]ersonal jurisdiction must exist for each claim asserted against a 
defendant.”164 BMS adds a more rigorous evaluation of a corporate 
defendant’s connections that give rise to the claim on top of this 
existing claim-by-claim jurisdictional analysis. 
A faithful application of BMS, therefore, counsels a direct 
affiliation with a forum, limited jurisdictional discovery, and rigorous 
claim-by-claim analysis to guard against the bootstrapping of 
 
 161.  In re: KBR, Inc., 893 F.3d 241, 254 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, 
PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 780–81 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding plaintiffs “entitled to limited entitled to 
limited jurisdictional discovery to explore their alter ego theory”). 
 162.  BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980)). 
 163.  See Putting the “Specific” Back in Specific Jurisdiction: The Importance of Claim-By-
Claim Jurisdictional Analysis in a Post-BMS Landscape, Drug & Device Law, Jan. 11, 2018, at 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2018/01/guest-post-putting-the-specific-back-in-specific-
jurisdiction-the-importance-of-claim-by-claim-jurisdictional-analysis-in-a-post-bms-
landscape.html (stating that claim-by-claim jurisdiction is “well recognized in the pre-BMS case 
law and should not be forgotten in the post-BMS landscape”). 
 164.  Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery, Inc., 368 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2004); 
see also Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[P]laintiff 
bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum contacts must establish specific 
jurisdiction for each claim.”); Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 256–60 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(conducting specific jurisdiction analysis for each alleged cause of action); Moncrief Oil Int’l 
Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 150 (Tex. 2013) (“[S]pecific jurisdiction requires us to 
analyze jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis.”); Blume Law Firm PC v. Pierce, 741 
N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (“When multiple claims are raised, personal jurisdiction 
must be established for each claim.”). 
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unrelated claims for jurisdictional purposes.165 There will always be a 
rightful place to bring a lawsuit, namely where the defendant is at 
home or the injury occurred. These states have a legal interest in 
administering the litigation, and juries of these states have an 
obligation to help the parties resolve their disputes. Allowing claims 
to migrate to other states, predicated on tangential business activity, 
violates the rights of states with jurisdiction to hear these claims and 
of defendants not to be hauled into courts lacking a meaningful 
affiliation with the claims.166 
E. Application of Personal Jurisdiction Decisions to Other Types of 
Cases 
Each of the recent Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases 
discussed above involved individual state claims against corporate 
defendants. They did not involve class actions (whether brought in 
state or federal court), Multi-District Litigation (MDL), or purely 
federal actions.167 How the Court’s rulings apply in these other types 
of cases is already being litigated. 
1. Class Actions 
Courts have taken very different approaches with respect to 
applying the Court’s jurisprudence to class actions.168 The key 
question is whether an individual who cannot establish general or 
specific jurisdiction in a state over the defendant can, nonetheless, be 
included in a class action in that state. It is a foundational element of 
class action law, under federal and state rules of civil procedure, that a 
person who does not have a claim individually—whether for 
substantive or procedural reasons—cannot leverage class action rules 
to gain such a right of action. 
 
 165.  See BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1782 (“The relevant plaintiffs are not California residents and 
do not claim to have suffered harm in that State.”). 
 166.  See Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc., 2019 Ark. 84 (2019) (establishing a new 
state standard for determining specific personal jurisdiction to comport with Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb). 
 167.  See Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1789, n. 4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court today does not confront the question whether its opinion here would also apply to 
a class action in which a plaintiff injured in the forum State seeks to represent a nationwide class 
of plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there.”).  
 168.  See Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque de Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 860 
(N.D. Ill. 2018) (stating that “the applicability of Bristol–Myers to class actions is far from a 
settled issue”), rev’d on other grounds, 2018 WL 3659349 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2018). 
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Nevertheless, courts such as the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California have rejected the application of BMS 
to a nationwide class action.169 The named plaintiffs in a consumer 
class action alleging deceptive marketing of a soft drink could 
establish specific personal jurisdiction in California, but eighty-eight 
percent of the class members were not California residents and would 
not have the right to sue the defendant in California on their own. The 
court held that the class could remain intact because “in class actions, 
the citizenship of the unnamed plaintiffs is not taken into account for 
personal jurisdiction purposes.”170 In issuing this opinion, the court 
fully recognized that the inclusion of this “decidedly lopsided” 
number of nonresidents with two named California plaintiffs “was 
undoubtedly done to distinguish this case from Bristol-Myers.”171 But 
it allowed this “manipulat[ion]” because the “plaintiffs are the 
masters of their complaint.”172 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana also 
rejected the application of the U.S. Supreme Court’s personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence to a proposed class action.173 Here, the court 
distinguished BMS, which was an aggregation of individual claims, 
from class actions. It suggested that “a class action has different due 
process safeguards” than individual cases because, under Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are additional safeguards 
for class certification, namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, 
adequacy of representation, predominance and superiority.174 As a 
result, the court concluded BMS is not needed, or required, to protect 
defendants’ constitutional rights.175 The court also asserted that BMS 
should not interfere when the class mechanism is the more efficient 
and preferred means for resolving a dispute. 
Other courts have rejected these rationales.176 As the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois explained, BMS 
 
 169.  See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (N.D. 
Cal. Sept. 22, 2017). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  See In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 5971622, at *12–
16 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017). 
 174.  Id. at *14. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  See Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (rejecting 
application of BMS to putative class action brought by California and Illinois residents for 
financial losses from failed bitcoin exchange); Prac. Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du 
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“announced a general principle—that due process requires a 
‘connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue,’” 
which applies with “equal force whether or not the plaintiff is a 
putative class representative.”177 The court elaborated in another case, 
“it is more likely than not based on the Supreme Court’s comments 
about federalism that the courts will apply Bristol-Myers Squibb to 
outlaw nationwide class actions in a forum . . . where there is no 
general jurisdiction over the Defendants.”178 Further, the public policy 
rationale in BMS applied equally to class actions: “possible forum 
shopping is just as present in multi-state class actions.”179 As this court 
suggests, the issue here is not whether a corporation can be subject to 
multi-state class actions, but where the class actions can be filed. 
Multi-state class actions can always be filed where a company is at 
home and is subject to general personal jurisdiction. Other states 
likely will not have jurisdiction over the entire class’s claims. 
3. Multi-District Litigation 
Similar personal jurisdiction questions have arisen in MDLs, 
specifically for claims filed directly with an MDL.180 MDLs are 
products of federal statutory law whereby civil actions involving 
common questions of fact that are pending in federal district courts 
may be transferred to a specific district court for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings.181 The MDL statute itself does not 
confer jurisdiction for direct MDL filings, but does provide the MDL 
judge or “transferee court” with extra-jurisdictional authority to 
“exercise the powers of a district judge in any district for the purpose 
of conducting pretrial depositions” which could, in theory, imply 
broader jurisdictional authority.182 Some courts have treated such 
direct filed cases “as if they were transferred from a judicial district 
 
Soleil, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (stating in proposed class action alleging 
violations of federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act that “it is not clear how [plaintiff] can 
distinguish the Supreme Court’s basic holding in Bristol-Myers simply because this is a class 
action”), rev’d on other grounds, 2018 WL 3659349 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2018); McDonnell v. 
Nature’s Way Prods., LLC, 2017 WL 4864910, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017) (rejecting 
application of BMS to proposed class action alleging deceptive practices in marketing of energy 
bar supplements as “Made in the U.S.A.”).  
 177.  Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874 (quoting Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1781). 
 178.  DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., 2018 WL 461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018). 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  See MDL Direct Filing & Personal Jurisdiction, Drug & Device Law, Oct. 16, 2017, at 
https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/10/mdl-direct-filing-personal-jurisdiction.html. 
 181.  See 28 U.S. Code § 1407. 
 182.  See 28 U.S. Code § 1407(b). 
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sitting in the state where the case originated.”183 Others have held that 
the jurisdictional basis for MDL direct filing is rooted in 
“acquiescence – and thus the waiver – of the defendant(s) being 
sued.”184 Legal commentators have expressed “serious[] doubt that 
Congress intended to hide any jurisdictional elephants in MDL 
statutory mouseholes.”185 
Allowing direct filed MDL cases without personal jurisdiction 
limits could have a substantial impact on mass tort litigation. As Chief 
Judge Clay Land, of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of 
Georgia, observed when overseeing an MDL involving medical 
products, MDLs comprise “a growing percentage of the federal civil 
docket” and “seem to be the norm for cases involving common issues 
of law and fact.”186 Few cases are remanded back to their original 
courts, meaning “many of the most significant civil disputes on the 
federal docket are being resolved in a distant venue by a hand-picked 
judge, typically through some type of global settlement.”187 The judge 
noted that MDLs, which are increasingly becoming “alternative 
dispute resolution forum[s] for global settlements,” often have 
unintended consequences.188 Specifically, they can produce “incentives 
for the filing of cases that otherwise would not be filed if they had to 
stand on their own merit as a stand-alone action.”189 “Some lawyers 
seem to think that their case will be swept into the MDL where a 
global settlement will be reached . . . allowing them to obtain a 
recovery without the individual merit of their case being scrutinized 
as closely as it would if it proceeded as a separate individual 
action.”190 Thus, MDLs can generate a “perverse result”: instead of 
promoting judicial economy, they can clog dockets with claims that 
 
 183.  See In re Depuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re 
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Marketing, Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 
1375011, at *6 (S.D. Ill. April 12, 2011)); see also In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 2017 WL 5971622, at *17–20 (stating that while the “jurisdiction of state courts are 
cabined by its state’s geography . . . federal court jurisdiction is broader based” such that 
personal jurisdiction concerns regarding out-of-state plaintiffs may be inapplicable with respect 
to federal actions, nationwide class actions, and MDLs”).   
 184.  Supra note 180. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 4705807, 
at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2016). 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Id.  
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
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“never would have entered the federal court system without the 
MDL.”191 
Faithful application of general and specific due process 
requirements could provide MDL judges with an important case 
management tool against abusive direct filings. As Judge Land 
explained, transferee courts can exercise caution and “consider 
approaches that weed out non-meritorious cases early, efficiently, and 
justly.”192 
3. Federal Cases 
Plaintiffs seeking to impose jurisdiction over foreign companies in 
federal courts have argued that the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
rulings do not apply to their cases. Jurisdiction for state causes of 
action are based on due process protections in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, whereas jurisdiction in federal courts is grounded in due 
process in the Fifth Amendment. They point out that in BMS, the 
Court expressly left “open the question whether the Fifth 
Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a federal court.”193 The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, though, has explained that courts have 
“uniformly rejected arguments that the general jurisdiction analysis 
under the Fifth Amendment differs from the principles set forth by 
the Supreme Court in Goodyear and Daimler.”194 Courts have also 
rejected such distinctions with respect to specific personal 
jurisdiction.195 In doing so, judges have appreciated that the “language 
and policy considerations of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments are virtually identical” and “decisions 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guide 
[courts] in determining what due process requires in the Fifth 
Amendment jurisdictional context.”196 
 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  Id. at *2. 
 193.  See In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 1268267, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016); BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1184.  
 194.  Id.; see also Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125 (“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in 
determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.”). 
 195.  See, e.g., Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723, at *4 (finding “no merit” to plaintiffs’ 
argument that BMS does not apply to federal courts “because federal courts routinely apply the 
specific jurisdiction analysis to defendants in cases that are before them solely on the basis of 
diversity”). 
 196.  See In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 1268267, at *4 
(quoting Schulman v. Inst. for Shipboard Educ., 624 Fed. Appx. 1002, 1006 (11th Cir. 2015)). 
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III. SO WHAT HAPPENS—OR SHOULD HAPPEN—NEXT? 
The Supreme Court’s recent series of personal jurisdiction 
decisions should have a major constructive impact on where cases are 
heard. Under the Court’s rulings, there are three archetypal places for 
suing a business: 1) the state where it is incorporated; 2) the state 
where it has its principal place of business; or 3) the state where the 
plaintiff sustained his or her injury. These are the limited jurisdictions 
where the state and its taxpayers have a legal interest in adjudicating 
the suit,197 and the defendant has notice as to where it may be subject 
to liability and for which types of legal actions.198 Thus, if the Court’s 
reasoning and intent are properly embraced by state courts, these 
rulings can be powerful weapons against forum shopping and 
litigation tourism. 
As Justice Sotomayor observed in her BMS dissent, the Court’s 
series of rulings provide “substantial curbs” that should result in more 
“piecemeal litigation,”199 where claims are heard in their proper states 
rather than concentrated in a few specific, plaintiff-chosen 
jurisdictions. This more diversified litigation environment can 
promote fairness, and facilitate each claim being resolved on its own 
merits.200 Should both sides see value and efficiency in litigating 
similar cases in a single jurisdiction, rather than in small actions 
around the country, they can agree to the filings and waiver of 
personal jurisdiction. 
A. Limiting “Judicial Hellholes” or “Magic Jurisdictions” 
If plaintiffs can file their cases in only a limited number of states, 
the jurisdictions that have become popular destinations for lawsuits 
should lose their pull. Dickie Scruggs, a well-known former plaintiffs’ 
lawyer, called these places his “magic jurisdiction[s].”201 In a moment 
of candor, Mr. Scruggs explained: 
What I call the “magic jurisdiction,” [is] where the judiciary is 
elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers have established 
relationships with the judges that are elected; they’re State Court 
 
 197.  See BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (discussing competing interests of proposed forum 
state). 
 198.  See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139. 
 199.  BMS, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 200.  See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 201.  Asbestos for Lunch, Panel Discussion at the Prudential Securities Financial Research 
and Regulatory Conference (May 9, 2002), in Industry Commentary (Prudential Securities, Inc., 
N.Y., New York), June 11, 2002, at 5 (quoting Richard Scruggs). 
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judges; they’re popul[ists]. . . . And, so it’s a political force in their 
jurisdiction, and it’s almost impossible to get a fair trial if you’re a 
defendant in some of these places.202 
A tort reform group is less diplomatic in naming these jurisdictions 
“Judicial Hellholes.”203 Every year since 2003, the American Tort 
Reform Foundation (ATRF) has issued its Judicial Hellholes report 
to shine a spotlight on abusive practices in these select jurisdictions. 
The quintessential example of forum shopping is in asbestos 
litigation. Any manufacturer with a remote historic connection to an 
asbestos-containing product or workplace faces lawsuits in Madison 
County, Illinois, which hosts one-quarter of the nation’s asbestos 
litigation.204 Very few of these claims, though, have any connection to 
Madison County. In 2015, only seventy-fiveof 1,224 asbestos cases 
filed there were on behalf of Illinois residents, and only six cases 
involved Madison County residents.205 Scholars have suggested that 
the ability to file asbestos-related claims in Madison County and 
other chosen jurisdictions is a key reason asbestos litigation, which 
should have been in decline, is growing in scope and intensity.206 Years 
earlier, when the ATRF first named Madison County a Judicial 
Hellhole, Judge DeLaurenti, who served in Madison County for 
twenty-seven years until 2000 said, “There’s some merit to the 
accusation of bias in Madison County. . . . When people come from 
hither and thither to file these cases, there’s gotta be an inducement, 
doesn’t there? They’re not coming to see beautiful Madison 
County.”207 
For a number of years, Philadelphia became a prime location to 
file lawsuits against pharmaceutical manufacturers. In 2009, the Court 
of Common Pleas President Judge undertook a “public campaign to 
lay out the welcome mat for increased mass torts filings.”208 The 
 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  See Judicial Hellholes, Am. Tort Reform Found., at https://www.judicialhellholes.org/. 
 204.  See KCIC, Asbestos Litigation: 2016 Mid-Year Update (2016), at 3. http://
riskybusiness.kcic.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/KCIC-Asbestos-Mid-Year-Report-2016-
1.pdf. 
 205.  See Heather Isringhausen Gvillo, Madison County Asbestos Filings Total 1,224; Only 6 
Percent Filed on Behalf of Illinois Residents, MADISON-ST. CLAIR RECORD, Mar. 23, 2016. 
 206.  See generally Mark D. Plevin, et al., Where are They Now, Part Six: An Update on 
Developments in Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 11-7 Mealey’s Asb. Bankr. Rep. 24 (2012). 
 207.  Martin Kasindorf, Robin Hood is Alive in Court, Say Those Seeking Lawsuit Limits, 
USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2004. 
 208.  Amaris Elliott-Engle, Common Pleas Court Seeing More Diabetes Drug Cases, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 19, 2009, at 1. 
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reported goal of this effort was to make the Complex Litigation 
Center for mass torts more attractive to attorneys to “tak[e] business 
away from other courts.”209 In 2015, out-of-state plaintiffs accounted 
for eighty-one percent of new pharmaceutical cases filed in 
Philadelphia courts, with that number dipping to sixty-five percent in 
2016.210 Local lawyers attribute this decrease to the initial impacts of 
Daimler.211 
In addition, a handful of states host most of the unfair trade 
practices claims against manufacturers. A report issued by the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform found that more 
than seventy-five percent of consumer lawsuits targeting food makers 
are filed in only four states.212 As indicated above, Montana has 
become a destination for FELA claims because the Montana 
Supreme Court has adopted a more liberal interpretation of the 
statute of limitations than several federal circuits and has a reputation 
for “empathizing with injured railroad workers” as compared to other 
states.213 
The impact of faithfully applying Daimler can be seen in 
Delaware. Before Daimler, out-of-state plaintiffs with no meaningful 
connection to Delaware increasingly filed asbestos claims there.214 
Daimler reversed this trend; asbestos claims filed in New Castle, 
Delaware fell from 219 in 2014 to 124 in 2015, a decline of forty-three 
percent.215 The Delaware Supreme Court found that “it is not tenable” 
after Daimler to exert personal jurisdiction over a manufacturer 
where the claims “had nothing to do with its activities in Delaware,” 
merely because the corporation registered to do business and 
 
 209.  Amaris Elliott-Engle, Philadelphia Courts May See Substantial Layoffs, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 29, 2009. 
 210.  See Max Mitchell, Out-of-State Pharma Filings Dip as Phila. Mass Torts Remain 
Steady, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 25, 2016. 
 211.  See id. 
 212.  See Cary Silverman & James Muehlberger, The Food Court Trends in Food and 
Beverage Class Action Litigation 8 (U.S. Chamber Inst. for Legal Reform 2017). Daimler has 
proven effective in dismissing or narrowing claims where there is no connection to the state. See, 
e.g., Weisblum v. Prophase Labs, Inc., 88 F.Supp.3d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing consumer 
class action fraud claims by California residents for lack of general jurisdiction over defendant 
while retaining such claims by New York residents). 
 213.  Paul Bovarnick, On the Tracks: Helping Injured Railroad Workers, Trial Lawyer, at 33 
(Fall 2012) (“[O]nce the railroad realized we could file . . . in Great Falls, they offered a 
generous settlement.”); see also Anderson v. BNSF Ry., 354 P.3d 1248 (Mont. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1495 (2016). 
 214.  See In re Asbestos Litig., 929 A.2d 373, 378 (Del. 2006) (finding out-of-state asbestos 
claims filed in Delaware courts began in May 2005 and quickly reached 129 claims). 
 215.  See KCIC, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 204, at 5. 
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appointed an agent to receive service of process in the state.216 The 
court further explained, “we have long ago become a truly national—
even international—economy, and the ability of foreign corporations 
to operate effectively throughout our nation is critical to our nation’s 
economic vitality and ability to create jobs.”217 “It is in the context of 
this global economy,” the court continued, “that the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued its rulings in Goodyear and Daimler.”218 
B. Removing Injustices from “Stockpiling” Claims in Single 
Jurisdictions 
Minimizing the consolidation of claims into a single jurisdiction, 
regardless of where, also advances the interests of justice, as claims 
would be more likely decided on their own merits. When hundreds, or 
even thousands, of claims are stockpiled into a court system, the focus 
even of well-intentioned judges can shift from dispensing justice to 
clearing cases from the docket. Sometimes these judges take shortcuts 
to temporarily fix a clogged docket. Experience, however, has shown 
that “mov[ing] large numbers of highly elastic mass torts through 
their litigation process at low transaction costs create the opportunity 
for new filings.”219 
Some lawyers have developed techniques to take advantage of 
these dynamics. As discussed above, MDL Judge Land expressed 
concerns about such tactics undermining the ability of a court to 
achieve justice.220 He was administering the MDL against Mentor 
Corporation over its mesh medical devices. Litigation over mesh, 
which is used to treat pelvic floor disorders in women, has become 
one of the largest mass torts in the country. There are several mesh 
manufacturers, more than one hundred mesh products, and now more 
than one hundred thousand claims alleging injuries from these 
products. Judge Land found that lawyers generated this mass of claims 
through an “onslaught of lawyer television solicitations,” but did such 
“little pre-filing preparation” that most of the cases were meritless 
 
 216.  Genuine Parts Co v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 125–26 (Del. 2016) (finding no personal 
jurisdiction over manufacturer incorporated in Georgia with principal place of business in 
Atlanta in asbestos claim brought by Georgia plaintiff who worked in Florida warehouse). 
 217.  Id. at 137. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 
ARIZ. L. REV. 595, 606 (1997). 
 220.  See supra notes 186 through 192 and accompanying text. 
APPEL_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2019  7:03 PM 
2019] THE SUPREME COURT’S PERSONAL JURISDICTION PARADIGM SHIFT 85 
and “should never have been brought.”221 He explained that the 
lawyers were leveraging the mass filings to create a presumption 
among judges, juries, and the media that there must be merit to the 
allegations and then generate mass settlements without the individual 
merit of their cases being scrutinized.222 If cases are heard individually 
in appropriate jurisdictions, such warehousing techniques will not 
work. 
Even when a case is heard individually and on its merits, the 
commitment of ensuring a fair trial can wane when the parties are 
from out-of-state. The Supreme Court has repeatedly appreciated that 
when a defendant company is from out-of-state, there is “the potential 
that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big 
businesses, particularly those without strong local presences.”223 
Further, when all parties are out-of-state, jurors can be frustrated that 
the sacrifice they make by serving on a jury is not going to address an 
alleged wrong in their communities. A jury’s mission is to provide a 
voice for its community, establish facts of a case, and ensure parties 
are treated neutrally and equally. An overwhelming majority of 
Americans have high regard for the jury system, but do not want to 
make professional and personal sacrifices for disputes having nothing 
to do with them.224 These concerns of injustice go to the heart of the 
fair play and substantial justice reasons the Court imposed new 
jurisdictional limits. 
C. Focusing on State Legal Climate and Venue Reform 
Finally, there has been an increase in attention to state liability 
laws, including attempts to tighten loose venue laws that would stop 
forum shopping within a state. Consider, for example, Missouri. Since 
2015, St. Louis, Missouri had become the destination of choice for 
thousands of filings by nonresident plaintiffs alleging injuries against 
various out-of-state product manufacturers.225 The Missouri Office of 
State Courts Administrator issued statistics showing that, from 2014 to 
 
 221.  In re Mentor Corp. Obtape Transobturator Sling Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 4705807, 
at *1 n. 2. 
 222.  See id. at *1.  
 223.  Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. 
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 464 (1993) (identifying “prejudice against large 
corporations, a risk that is of special concern when the defendant is a nonresident”). 
 224.  See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, Improving the Jury System in Virginia: Jury 
Patriotism Legislation is Needed, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 667–68 (2003).   
 225.  See St. Louis, Missouri, Judicial Hellholes, American Tort Reform Foundation, at 
http://www.judicialhellholes.org/2017-2018/st-louis-missouri/. 
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2015, filings in the City of St. Louis increased from around 3,000 to 
nearly 13,000.226 In 2016, more than 140 mass tort cases were pending 
in St. Louis, with 8,900 plaintiffs having no connection to the City.227 
Bloomberg Businessweek observed this development, reporting that 
“[h]undreds of plaintiffs with product liability claims . . . have been 
flocking to downtown St. Louis to a venue that over the past three 
years has developed a reputation for fast trials, favorable rulings, and 
big awards.”228 
For example, in 2016, more than 2,100 claims were grouped 
together in 260 lawsuits around the country alleging that talcum 
powder causes ovarian cancer.229 More than two-thirds of the 
claimants filed in St. Louis against the New Jersey-based 
manufacturer. Four of the first five trials in the City of St. Louis 
Circuit Court in 2016 and 2017 resulted in multi-million dollar 
plaintiff verdicts that cumulatively totaled more than $300 million.230 
The plaintiff in each of the five cases hailed from a state other than 
Missouri, including Alabama, South Dakota and California.231 By 
contrast, the initial talc cases heard in New Jersey were dismissed 
after the court determined that the plaintiffs’ experts, who testified in 
St. Louis, were not qualified to testify.232 Although a Missouri 
appellate court applying BMS overturned one of the initial talc 
verdicts in 2017 for want of specific personal jurisdiction in the City of 
St. Louis,233 these rulings continue to be overshadowed by large trial 
 
 226.  Compare 2015 Annual Statistical Report – Circuit Profiles, Missouri Courts, Table 25, 
available at https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=296 (reporting 12,887 civil cases filed in the 
City of St. Louis in 2015) with 2014 Annual Statistical Report – Circuit Profiles, Missouri 
Courts, Table 25 (reporting 3,168 civil cases filed in the City of St. Louis in 2014). 
 227.  See Reply Brief of Relator Abbott Labs, Inc, at 9 n.4, State ex rel. Abbott Labs, Inc. v. 
Ohmer, No. SC96718 (Mo. 2018) (reporting analysis of Missouri case records on pending mass 
tort cases in City of St. Louis); see also Phil Goldberg, Goldberg Testifies in Missouri for Venue 
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Louis Post-Dispatch, May 21, 2017, at A1, available at 2017 WLNR 15792696. 
 231.  See id. (reporting that the respective plaintiffs were residents of Alabama, South 
Dakota, California, Tennessee, and Virginia).  
 232.  See Brendan Pierson, After $195 million in Talc Verdicts, J&J Strives to Change Court, 
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court verdicts.234 In 2018, for instance, a St. Louis jury awarded $4.7 
billion to twenty-two plaintiffs in a consolidated talc case.235 
Other mass tort cases brought in the City of St. Louis have 
produced similar outcomes. In 2016, plaintiffs from Alaska, Michigan 
and Oklahoma who alleged PCBs caused their non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma obtained a $46 million verdict against Monsanto 
Company.236 Comparable lawsuits in Los Angeles and St. Louis 
County resulted in defense verdicts.237 
A variety of factors enable large awards and contribute to the City 
of St. Louis’s emergence as a jurisdiction of choice to file claims.238 
Missouri had loose standards and practices over the admissibility of 
expert evidence and maintains a standard for awarding punitive 
damages that is among the weakest in the country.239 Courts have also 
not properly enforced the joinder and venue laws on the books, which 
has allowed the mass aggregation of claims in St. Louis.240 In addition 
to being named a “Judicial Hellhole,” a 2017 survey of 1,300 
corporate litigators and senior executives done for the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce ranked Missouri’s liability system 49th in the country.241 
This legal climate created a reputational problem for Missouri, as 
eighty-five percent of the executives surveyed said a state’s litigation 
climate impacts their company’s decisions about where to locate and 
expand.242 
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As a result, the call for reform in Missouri has been loud, 
particularly over venue and joinder reforms.243 Legislation introduced 
in 2018 sought to clarify that an out-of-state claim cannot be joined to 
an in-state claim in order to defeat the state’s venue laws. The 
jurisdiction must be a proper venue for a claim in order to be joined 
with any other claim in that jurisdiction. Similarly, a defendant can be 
joined to a case only when each plaintiff can establish jurisdiction and 
venue against that defendant. If a claim is misjoined, it can still be 
heard, but it must be sent to the proper venue, whether in Missouri or 
in another state. 
This legislation gained renewed importance given the Missouri 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Barron v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,244 in 
which the court weakened the enforcement mechanism for a case 
heard in an improper Missouri venue. The court held that even if a 
plaintiff intentionally files a claim in the wrong Missouri venue, the 
defendant’s challenge on appeal will be granted only if the defendant 
can prove specific prejudice in the wrong venue.245 This is a near 
impossible bar to meet. Old habits die hard. 
In early 2019, the situation in Missouri improved significantly. The 
Missouri Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson v. 
Burlison,246 held that permissive joinder of a personal injury claim is 
not permitted in a venue where the claim would not have otherwise 
been proper. In this case, a St. Louis City resident had brought a 
product liability action against an out-of-state manufacturer. Dozens 
of non-resident claims were then joined to the resident’s action, 
seeking to have their claims heard in St. Louis City as well. The court 
granted the manufacturer’s writ of prohibition to sever the non-
resident claims and transfer them to St. Louis County where venue 
may be proper.247 A few months later, the Missouri General Assembly 
enacted a version of the venue reform legislation introduced in 
2018.248 The legislation expressly adopted the holding of Burlison and 
established other venue and jurisdictional requirements to make clear 
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that courts should not hear claims that belong elsewhere.249 Thus, 
progress to curb forum-shopping continues to be made. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s reevaluation of the constitutional limits of 
personal jurisdiction, after a seventy-year hiatus, marks a turning 
point away from “sprawling” theories of general and specific 
jurisdiction toward an exacting analysis of where a business may be 
subject to a lawsuit. A clear impetus for this paradigm-shift in 
jurisprudence was the Court’s desire to curb forum shopping and 
litigation tourism, which plaintiffs engage in to obtain an advantage 
unrelated to a claim’s merits. The Court’s jurisprudence reflects the 
modern economy, where many corporate defendants maintain a 
national or global presence, as well as the modern litigation 
environment, where plaintiffs’ lawyers have developed tactics based 
on the ability to stockpile claims in chosen jurisdictions. 
Peering out on the horizon, the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
decisions should produce an even-handed distribution of litigation in 
the United States. As courts wade through the outstanding issues 
regarding the scope and application of the Court’s decisions—issues 
which have been discussed in this article—the full import of this 
jurisprudence will likely emerge. There is no doubt that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers will put forth creative arguments for maintaining their forum 
shopping advantage and that some courts will try to keep out-of-state 
cases in their jurisdictions. A straightforward reading of the Court’s 
new personal jurisdiction rulings, however, requires courts to reject 
these attempts at forum shopping and uphold the due process rights 
of corporate defendants. 
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